This Online Appendix extends the analysis carried out in "Why Do Countries Mandate Accrual Accounting for Tax Purposes?" in three ways. First, we use different estimation strategies to better account for unobservable heterogeneity between the sample countries. Second, the paper focused on the sample of 26 countries and, similar to prior studies, excluded Norway, treating it as an outlier. We, thus, replicate our main results after including data from Norway in this Online Appendix. Third, we examine the sensitivity of our results to individual country effects by excluding one country at a time. Table A1 re-examines hypothesis 2 using alternative estimation strategies as our results could be driven by unobserved country characteristics. Our dependent variable is corporate tax revenues and our main test variable is the interaction between our accrual index and changes in the industry value added (Accruals i × VA_growth it in model (4)). We predict that the use of accrual accounting increases the sensitivity of tax revenues to changes in economic activity. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we first use a fully interacted model in which we interact all variables with VA_growth. Second, we use a random effects estimator to control for the variation of unobservables over time. Third, we include country fixed effects to capture the effect of time invariant country characteristics. While the latter approach does not allow us to estimate the effect of Accruals, the effect of Accruals × VA_growth-our test of hypothesis 2-can be
re-examines hypothesis 2 using alternative estimation strategies as our results could be driven by unobserved country characteristics. Our dependent variable is corporate tax revenues and our main test variable is the interaction between our accrual index and changes in the industry value added (Accruals i × VA_growth it in model (4)). We predict that the use of accrual accounting increases the sensitivity of tax revenues to changes in economic activity. To account for unobserved heterogeneity, we first use a fully interacted model in which we interact all variables with VA_growth. Second, we use a random effects estimator to control for the variation of unobservables over time. Third, we include country fixed effects to capture the effect of time invariant country characteristics. While the latter approach does not allow us to estimate the effect of Accruals, the effect of Accruals × VA_growth-our test of hypothesis 2-can be identified. Finally, we use a more flexible version of the fixed-effects model which additionally includes interactions of VA_growth with year indicator variables. Allowing the slope of VA_growth to vary by year, we can rule out any country-invariant differences in the relationship between economic growth and corporate tax revenues that change over time. Table A1 reports that the coefficient on our test variable is positive and statistically significant across all specifications. This allows us to rule out that unobserved cross-country heterogeneity drives our results.
[Insert Table A1 about here]
We next examine whether our results are sensitive to inclusion of Norway and use the sample of 27 countries in Table A2 . Column (1) of Table A2 replicates our main results from Table 5 , Column (2) replicates Column (2) of Table 7 , Column (3) replicates Column (3) of Table 8 , and
Column (4) replicates Column (4) of Table 12 . We find that including Norway does not affect the inferences of our analysis: We continue to find that accruals lead to smoother revenues (Column (1)), that accruals increase the correlation between tax revenues and economic activity (Columns (2) and (3)), and that countries use accruals to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures (Column (4)).
[Insert Table A2 about here] Finally, we ensure that our results are not driven by a single country and report the test of hypothesis 1 and 2 after excluding one country at a time. Figure A1 assesses the robustness to country effects by replicating results in Column (4) of Table 5 after excluding one sample country at a time. The figure plots the coefficient estimate of Accruals for each of 26 estimations using our original sample. Figure A2 replicates Column (3) of Table 8 after excluding one sample country at a time. We plot the coefficient estimate of Accruals × VA_growth. We find that accruals increase the smoothness of tax revenues and lead to higher correlation between tax revenues and economic activity across all specifications. Figure A1 and A2 about here] Overall, these additional tests further support our finding that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, and that regulators use accruals in the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures.
[Insert

Figure A1: Sensitivity of Hypothesis 1 Tests to Country Effects
This figure assesses the robustness to country effects by replicating results in Column (4) of Table 5 after excluding one sample country at a time (recorded on the x-axis). This procedure leads to 26 estimations. The figure plots the coefficient estimate of Accruals as well as the upper (95%) and the lower (5%) confidence intervals.
Figure A2: Sensitivity of Hypothesis 2 Tests to Country Effects
This figure assesses the robustness to country effects by replicating results in Column (3) of Table 8 after excluding one sample country at a time (recorded on the x-axis). This procedure leads to 26 estimations. The figure plots the coefficient estimate of Accruals× VA_growth as well as the upper (95%) and the lower (5%) confidence intervals. This table replicates our main results from Table 5 in column (1), from Table 7 in column (2), from Table 8 in column (3), and from Table 12 in column (4) after including data from Norway.
